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Professor Lowenfeld Responds
Andreas F. Lowenfeld
Professor Silberman is as usual gracious in acknowledging
in various formats, and my efforts to restore conflict
writings
my
of laws to its place as a branch of international law, a place it has
occupied in most of the world outside the United States, and
occupied here as well in the view of Story and others who wrote
before the balkanization of American law in the latter part of the
nineteenth century. We have no disagreements on the value of
the comparative method in teaching conflict of laws, civil
procedure, or international litigation.
This brief response is addressed only to what Professor
Silberman describes as the "ever-puzzling" decision in Asahi v.
Superior Court.
There is nothing puzzling about that decision, and I do not
The Court
believe Professor Silberman is really puzzled.
concluded that it made no sense-i.e., it was unreasonable-to
subject a Japanese subcomponent maker to the jurisdiction of a
California court on a claim for indemnity or contribution by a
U.S.
resident
no
maker, when
component
Taiwanese
party-plaintiff or defendant-had an interest in the outcome of
What troubles her, it seems, is that the
that controversy.
discretionary element in jurisdiction over non-residents, which
she approves of in England, has crept into the American approach
to jurisdiction through use of the word "reasonable." Professor
Silberman would like judicial jurisdiction to be like-or at least
more like-her view of the Internal Revenue Code; either the court
has jurisdiction or it does not.' I believe judicial jurisdiction can
never be wholly precise, once it moves from a dependence on

Charles F. Denison Professor of Law, New York University.
We know from her other writings that she would then reintroduce the
1.
element of discretion through expanded resort to forum non conveniens, but that
is different, it is not formal, like jurisdiction, or sacred, like the Constitution, and
usually leaves the last word to the court of first instance. See, e.g., Linda J.
Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposalfor a Uniform Standard, 28
TEX. IN'LrL.J. 501 (1993).
*
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personal service in a given territory to concepts such as
"domicile," "arising out of," 'place of performance of the
obligation," "presence," and "transaction of business." More
significant, however, is the discontent of Professor Silberman, and
like-minded proceduralists such as Professor Burbank, with
flexible construction of the Constitution itself.
It might have been better if judicial jurisdiction in the United
States had not been captured by the American passion for
constitutionalization. 2 It is ironic that while the other teachings
of Pennoyer v. Neff,3 about in personam jurisdiction and about
quasi in rem jurisdiction, have been discarded, the doctrine that
all of judicial jurisdiction in the United States-state, federal, and
it appears international-is subject to scrutiny under the Due
Process Clauses remains firmly established and probably
unassailable. That being so, I see no way out, and no reason to
seek a way out, of treating jurisdiction within the grand and
flexible concepts of the Constitution.
Are we upset that the Constitution does not prescribe a dollar
ceiling for bail, but says it shall not be excessive? Or that it does
not prescribe a stated number of days before an accused must be
brought to trial, but declares the right to a speedy trial? Or that
it does not adopt a single formula to calculate what the
government must pay a person whose property it takes, but states
that the compensation must be just? Or, to come closest to the "r"
word that gives Professor Silberman the willies, are we upset that
the Constitution does not forbid all searches, or even all
warrantless searches, but only unreasonableones?

It is my turn to be puzzled, not at the result in Asahi or its
technique, but at the reaction it provoked from reasonable
persons like Professor Silberman. I don't think she is ready to
join Justice Black in grumbling about Chief Justice Stone's
judgment in InternationalShoe v. Washington.4 That judgment, as
we all know, concluded that defendant's operations in the forum
state "make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional
conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state
s
to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there."
Being half a generation older than Professor Silberman, I still
recall encountering lawyers who could not believe that Pennoyer

2.
Cf. Friedrich K. Juenger, American Jurisdiction:A Story of Comparative
Neglect, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1993).
3.
95 U.S. 714 (1878).
4.
326 U.S. 310 (1945)
5.
Id at 320.
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was no longer the basic source of the American law of judicial
jurisdiction; but in more than twenty years of close acquaintance,
I do not recall Professor Silberman ever taking that position, or
questioning the statement in InternationalShoe that it is "evident
that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between
those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to
suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or
quantitative." 6 What then upsets her about Asaiu?
Is it the suggestion that the claim, not just the acts of the
defendant are looked at? That can't be. Is it the suggestion that
the interest of the forum state in the controversy is thought
relevant?
That might upset some traditionalists, possibly
including Justice Scalia, who alone among the members of the
Supreme Court declined to sign on to the famous Part II(B) of
Justice O'Connor's opinion, but it could hardly upset a conflict of
laws professional such as Professor Silberman. Is it the suggestion that there is a difference between a defendant from Japan
and a defendant from Oregon? Or is it the hint that international
law plays a part in defining the acceptable contours of jurisdiction
of American courts over foreign defendants?
I think this is the clue for my puzzlement, but hardly a
solution to the puzzle. Professor Silberman's Article demonstrates
that she shares my interest in exploring the response of other
systems to the problem of judicial jurisdiction. Why then should
she resist the idea suggested in Asahi and developed in the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (as well as in my 1994
Hague Lectures) that there is a customary international law of
jurisdiction of courts, and that reasonableness is an important
element of that law? I do not believe that Professor Silberman
thinks it would be reasonable to try the controversy between
Cheng Shin and Asahi in Sacramento, California. Rather, she
contends that asking whether or not that would be reasonable is
unsound. But why? Is she concerned that the opinion in the
Asahi case undermines undivided fealty to that constitutionally
inspiring and mathematically irrefutable concept-minimum
contacts? I still don't get it.

6.
Id. at 319. Note also that the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
adopted reasonableness as the basic principle of judicial jurisdiction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICr OF LAWS § 24(1) (1971). It repeats that standard
in various other sections. Id. §§ 25, 26, 27(k), 30, 31, 36-39, 42, 47, 49-52, 56-

58,65, 69,72.

